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Constitution for a new Hungary – 
the domestic and regional implications
Andrzej Sadecki 
Mateusz Gniazdowski 
The new constitution will come into force in Hungary on 1 January 20121. 
Its adoption is part of the state reform which the Fidesz party led by Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán has been implementing since it won the election 
in April 2010. Fidesz, along with the Christian Democrats which support it, 
has a qualified majority of two-thirds of the votes in parliament and may 
introduce solutions to facilitate its rule without support from other group-
ings and it is taking advantage of this opportunity. One example of this has 
been the amendment of the constitution ten times followed by a speedy 
adoption of a new constitution. The next step will be passing dozens 
of constitutional laws which regulate essential areas of the functioning of 
the state over the next few months. 
Both the way and the scope in which the changes have been made have 
raised controversies both at home and abroad. The regulations reinforce 
the position of the ruling camp on the Hungarian political scene, assisting 
it in passing the test of the next elections. Slovakia, which has criticised 
the practice of granting Hungarian citizenship to ethnic Hungarians living 
in other countries, is opposing the promise of also granting them electoral 
rights. The constitutional reinforcement of the state’s ‘responsibility’ for 
the diaspora linked with the collective concept of national minority rights 
fostered by Hungary has already led to tensions in the region.  
The constitutional process
Hungary	 is	 the	only	 former	Eastern	bloc	country	which	did	not	adopt	a	new	constitution	
after	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 communist	 regime.	 However,	 fundamental	 amendments	 to	 the	
constitution	of	1949	were	made	already	in	October	1989	by	including	first	of	all	provisions	
concerning	democratic	elections	and	a	free-market	economy.	The	issue	of	adopting	a	new	
constitution	emerged	in	the	mid	1990s.	However,	the	then	coalition	partners,	the	Hungar-
ian	Socialist	Party	(MSzP)	and	the	 liberals	 from	the	Alliance	of	Free	Democrats	(SzDSz),	
failed	to	compromise	at	that	time.	A	new	constitution	became	a	topic	of	discussion	again	
after	the	parliamentary	elections	in	April	2010,	which	amidst	a	deep	political	and	economic	
crisis,	were	won	by	Fidesz,	 removing	 from	power	 the	discredited	Socialists	and	Liberals.	
Fidesz	and	the	Christian	Democratic	People’s	Party	(KDNP)	won	over	two	thirds	of	the	seats	
i s s u e  6 0  |  2 9 . 0 7 . 2 0 1 1  |  c e N T R e  f O R  e A s T e R N  s T u d i e s
cOMMeNTARyOsw
2
in	parliament.	Fidesz	politicians,	who	were	critical	about	the	transformation	process,	were	
proclaiming	that	the	‘ballot	box	revolution’	which	had	lifted	them	to	power	proved	that	the	
constitution	of	1949	already	had	no	public	legitimacy,	and	the	country	after	two	decades	
of	post-communist	drift	needed	a	new	constitution.	
József	Szájer,	a	representative	of	Fidesz	in	the	European	Parliament,	was	put	in	charge	of	
developing	a	draft	constitution.	He	also	 led	the	National	Consultation	Committee,	which	
prepared	the	formula	for	public	consultations.	When	the	draft	constitution	was	announced	
in	late	February/early	March	2011,	a	questionnaire	with	questions	concerning	the	amend-
ments	proposed	by	Fidesz	was	sent	out	to	the	approximately	8	million	citizens	who	have	
voting	rights.	Almost	one	million	of	the	questionnaires	were	completed	and	sent	back,	which	
the	ruling	class	deemed	a	successful	public	consultation.	They	were	to	ensure	additional	
legitimacy	to	the	draft	constitution	because	Fidesz	has	been	criticised	for	its	refusal	to	hold	
a	referendum	concerning	the	constitution.	However,	the	draft	was	presented	to	parliament	
only	two	weeks	after	the	deadline	for	sending	back	the	questionnaire,	which	gave	opposi-
tion	circles	grounds	to	doubt	whether	the	answers	provided	in	the	questionnaires	had	really	
been	taken	into	account.	The	questionnaires	also	did	not	contain	questions	about	the	most	
controversial	changes,	such	as	the	reduction	of	the	competences	of	the	Constitutional	Court	
and	granting	voting	rights	to	ethnic	Hungarians	living	in	other	countries.	
The	opposition	parties	boycotted	the	work	on	the	new	constitution	and	demanded	a	refer-
endum	be	held.	They	emphasised	that	this	was	a	‘Fidesz	constitution’	and	not	a	basic	law	
resulting	from	a	shared	compromise.	The	Socialists	while	criticising	the	hastiness	(only	nine	
days	 were	 envisaged	 for	 the	 parliamen-
tary	 debate	 on	 the	 constitution)	 referred	
to	the	political	change	as	a	constitutional	
‘coup’.	 Although	 over	 150	 amendments	
were	passed	at	that	time,	all	of	them	were	
proposed	by	members	of	the	government	
coalition.	Criticism	of	the	new	constitution	
has	become	the	main	area	of	activity	for	
the	opposition,	which	has	been	seeking	support	abroad.	The	Socialist	leaders	declared	that	
changing	the	new	constitution	is	the	key	political	goal	of	their	party.	The	far	right	Jobbik	
in	turn	protested	against	the	rejection	of	 its	twenty	amendments,	 the	most	 important	of	
which	in	its	opinion	was	the	proposal	of	extending	constitutional	‘protection’	to	Hungarian	
land	and	water	reserves.	
The symbols of the old Hungary and modifications of the tripartite system 
The	 new	 constitution	 was	 adopted	 by	 the	 Hungarian	 Parliament	 on	 18	 April	 2011;	
262	of	the	386	MPs	voted	for,	44	voted	against	and	one	abstained.	MPs	from	Fidesz	and	
the	Christian	Democrats	voted	to	adopt	the	constitution,	Jobbik	voted	against,	while	repre-
sentatives	of	the	other	two	clubs,	Socialists	from	the	MSzP	and	Greens	from	the	LMP,	did	
not	participate	in	the	vote	in	protest.	The	document	was	signed	on	25	April	by	President	
Pál	Schmitt,	who	is	linked	to	the	government	team.	
The	new	constitution	changes	the	name	of	the	state;	what	was	known	as	the	‘Republic	of	
Hungary’	(Magyar	Köztársaság)	will	now	be	named	simply	‘Hungary’	(Magyarország),	while	
the	word	 ‘republic’	 is	only	mentioned	 in	the	article	which	determines	the	political	system	
of	the	state.	This	change	sparked	a	heated	discussion.	For	Fidesz	this	was	a	symbolic	disso-
ciation	from	the	country’s	communist	past	and	it	was	drawing	on	the	continuity	of	the	historic	
name,	which	is	also	evident	in	the	reference	made	in	the	preamble	to	the	Holy	Crown	of	
Hungary	as	a	symbol	of	the	continuation	of	Hungarian	statehood	and	the	unity	of	the	nation.	
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Fidesz politicians were proclaiming that 
the constitution of 1949 already had 
no public legitimacy, and the country 
after two decades of post-communist 
drift needed a new constitution.
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The	left-wing	opposition	saw	no	reason	for	changing	the	official	name	of	the	country,	and	
even	saw	this	move	as	drawing	on	undemocratic	traditions	of	Hungarian	statehood.	
However,	the	new	constitution	brings	no	fundamental	change	to	the	political	system	of	this	
state.	It	slightly	increases	the	competences	of	parliament	(it	will	elect	the	presiding	judge	of	
the	Constitutional	Court)	and	the	president	(who	may	dissolve	parliament	if	it	fails	to	pass	
the	budget	by	31	March	of	any	given	year).	It	restricts	the	possibilities	for	holding	referen-
dums;	while	referendums	of	a	binding	nature	will	remain,	those	of	a	consultative	nature	will	
be	liquidated.	The	constitution	has	also	significantly	increased	the	number	of	constitutional	
acts	which	provide	detailed	regulations	for	the	most	important	issues	concerning	the	opera-
tion	of	the	state,	the	amendment	of	which	will	require	a	qualified	majority	of	two	third	of	the	
votes	in	parliament.	Laws	regulating	pensions,	taxes	and	the	operation	of	the	National	Bank	
of	Hungary	have	been	added	recently	to	the	already	thick	catalogue	of	these	acts.	
The weakened Constitutional Court
In	the	context	of	the	separation	of	powers,	the	most	fundamental	and	controversial	changes	
concern	the	Constitutional	Court.	Fidesz	reduced	the	court’s	powers	already	in	2010.	When	
the	court	deemed	a	law	retroactively	imposing	an	additional	98%	tax	on	the	highest	sever-
ance	pays	in	the	public	sector	to	be	unconstitutional,	Fidesz	amended	the	constitution	to	
reduce	the	court’s	competences	in	budget	and	tax	related	issues	and	adopted	the	law	in	
an	unchanged	form.	
The	 new	 constitution	 provides	 for	 further	 reductions	 in	 the	 competences	 and	 changes	
in	the	operation	of	the	Constitutional	Court.	The	number	of	the	judges	will	be	increased	
from	11	 to	15,	which	will	allow	 the	 ruling	 team	 to	nominate	 five	new	 judges	during	 its	
present	tenure.	The	judges’	nine-year	terms	in	office	have	been	extended	to	twelve	years.	
The	procedure	for	nominating	the	presiding	judge	has	also	changed.	The	presiding	judge,	
currently	elected	from	among	the	judges	by	the	judges	themselves,	is	to	be	nominated	by	
parliament.	Furthermore,	the	Constitutional	Court	will	be	deprived	of	its	essential	compe-
tences.	 It	 will	 have	 competences	 to	 de-
cide	 on	 budget	 issues	 only	 when	 public	
debt	falls	below	the	constitutional	limit	of	
50%	 of	 GDP.	 The	 new	 constitution	 also	
liquidates	the	actio popularis	rule,	accord-
ing	to	which	each	citizen	may	request	the	
court	to	determine	whether	a	given	regu-
lation	 is	 constitutional2.	 These	 changes	
have	 been	 criticised	 by	 the	 opposition	
and	also	by	some	experts	in	constitutional	
law	(for	example,	László	Solyom,	a	former	
president,	who	was	presiding	judge	of	the	Constitutional	Court	in	1990–1998).	They	have	
also	pointed	to	the	amendments	made	at	the	last	moment	under	which	the	retirement	age	
for	judges	and	public	prosecutors	was	lowered	from	70	to	62.	When	the	new	constitution	
comes	into	force,	this	regulation	may	seriously	upset	the	operation	of	the	justice	system,	
since	around	300	judges	and	public	prosecutors	will	be	forced	to	retire3.
	
	
	
	
	
2	 Since	1	January	2012,	
this	power	will	be	vested	
in	the	government,	a	minimum	
of	one	quarter	of	MPs,	
the	ombudsman	and	judges.
3	 This	regulation	does	not	
pertain	to	the	president	
of	the	Curia	(the	new	constitu-
tion	introduces	this	term	
in	place	of	the	Supreme	Court)	
and	to	the	attorney	general.
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The constitution has also significantly 
increased the number of constitutio-
nal acts which provide detailed 
regulations for the most important 
issues concerning the operation 
of the state, the amendment 
of which will require a qualified 
majority of two third of the votes.
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The strengthened Budget Council 
and the constitutional entrenchment of the forint
The	article	setting	the	‘prudence	threshold’	for	public	debt	at	a	level	of	50%	of	GDP	has	
been	widely	appreciated	both	at	home	and	abroad4.	The	state’s	high	debt	 is	one	of	 the	
greatest	 problems	Hungary	 has	 had	 to	 deal	with	 for	 a	 long	 time.	 It	 has	 reached	 80%	
of	GDP,	and	one	of	 the	major	 tasks	 for	 the	government	 led	by	Orbán	 is	 to	significantly	 re-
duce	the	debt.	Additionally,	the	new	constitution	strengthens	the	role	of	the	Budget	Council5,	
which	has	the	right	to	veto	a	budget	act.	People	linked	to	Fidesz	will	form	this	Council	and	
will	be	nominated	for	six-year	terms.	So	if	Fidesz	loses	power	after	the	elections	in	2014,	
the	Council	may	then	play	an	essential	political	role.	If	it	vetoes	the	budget,	and	the	govern-
ment	fails	to	adopt	a	new	one	within	the	set	deadline,	the	president	will	be	authorised	to	
dissolve	parliament	and	schedule	new	elections.	
The	new	constitution	also	includes	a	regulation,	according	to	which	the	forint	is	the	currency	
of	Hungary.	This	seemingly	insignificant	statement	may	impede	the	introduction	of	the	euro	
in	Hungary	in	the	future	because	this	will	require	the	constitution	to	be	amended.	Although	
it	is	expected	that	the	euro	will	be	adopted	in	2020	at	the	earliest,	the	government	will	now	
have	to	ensure	support	from	a	qualified	majority	to	make	this	change.	
Responsibility for the diaspora
The	new	constitution	puts	a	stronger	emphasis	on	bonds	between	Hungary	and	the	Hungar-
ian	diaspora6.	The	state	guided	by	the	“idea	of	one	Hungarian	nation”	is	to	be	“responsible”	
for	the	lives	of	ethnic	Hungarians	living	in	other	countries,	it	will	support	the	preservation	and	
development	of	these	communities,	their	efforts	“to	remain	Hungarian”	and	mutual	co-oper-
ation	and	collaboration	with	the	motherland	(Article	D).	The	constitutional	obligation	to	have	
a	registered	residential	address	in	Hungary	in	order	to	be	granted	voting	rights	has	been	lifted,	
and	 –	 as	 promised	 by	 government	 repre-
sentatives	–	regulations	concerning	the	use	
of	voting	rights	by	citizens	living	abroad	will	
come	into	force	already	this	year.	
These	 are	 the	 next	 steps	Orbán’s	 govern-
ment	is	making	towards	the	reinforcement	of	
the	bonds	between	Hungary	and	Hungar-
ian	communities	in	neighbouring	countries,	
the	reasons	for	which	include	the	will	to	put	
off	or	at	least	slow	down	the	ongoing	assimilation	processes	and	to	facilitate	travel	in	the	EU	
for	ethnic	Hungarians	who	live	in	Ukraine	and	Serbia.	The	citizenship	act	was	amended	on	
26	May	2010,	soon	after	the	formation	of	the	new	government.	It	came	into	force	at	the	begin-
ning	of	2011	and	brought	facilitations	in	granting	Hungarian	citizenship	primarily	by	lifting	the	
obligation	to	have	registered	permanent	residence	in	Hungary.	In	July	2011,	the	number	appli-
cants	for	Hungarian	citizenship	in	the	neighbouring	countries	exceeded	100,000.	According	to	
estimations	presented	by	Deputy	Prime	Minister	Zsolt	Semjén	on	18	July	2011,	their	number	
will	have	reached	half	a	million	by	the	end	of	the	present	parliament’s	term	(2014).	
It	 is	still	unclear	whether	Hungarians	 living	abroad	will	also	be	granted	passive	electoral	
rights,	whether	they	will	vote	for	candidates	from	general	Hungarian	lists	or	whether	sepa-
rate	seats	in	parliament	will	be	granted	to	them.	If	the	former	is	the	case,	they	could	influ-
ence	the	election	of	even	approximately	20%	of	MPs,	whereas	in	the	latter	situation	they	
could	have	more	than	ten	parliamentary	seats	ensured.	According	to	the	constitution,	each	
citizen	who	has	an	active	voting	right	may	also	take	part	in	a	referendum.
	
4	 When	this	limit	is	exceeded,	
the	government	has	the	
obligation	to	pass	a	budget	in	
which	public	debt	is	reduced.	
5	 The	Budget	Council,	which	
was	established	in	2008,	
supervises	the	process	of	
adopting	the	budget,	and	its	
members	are	elected	by	
the	president	(chairman),	
the	president	of	the	National	
Bank	of	Hungary	and	the	head	
of	the	Audit	Office.
	
	
	
	
6	 The	constitution	presently	
in	force	provides	only	that	
“the	Republic	of	Hungary	has	
the	sense	of	responsibility	for	
the	fate	of	Hungarians	living	
abroad	and	supports	their	
contact	with	the	motherland.”
If the Council vetoes the budget, 
and the government fails to adopt 
a new one within the set deadline, 
the president will be authorised 
to dissolve parliament and schedule 
new elections. 
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7	 Including	the	Hungarian	Civil	
Liberties	Union	(TASZ),	
Amnesty	International	
and	Human	Rights	Watch.	
The	granting	of	the	right	of	vote	to	Hungarians	living	abroad	will	increase	the	significance	
of	 issues	 related	 to	bonds	with	 compatriots	 living	abroad	 in	Hungarian	politics	 and	will	
introduce	a	new	electorate	with	the	potential	to	influence	Hungary’s	foreign	policy.	The	po-
litical	right	is	likely	to	benefit	most	from	the	decision	to	grant	voting	rights	to	the	Hungarian	
diaspora	(this	is	a	predominantly	conservative	electorate,	likely	to	vote	for	groupings	which	
draw	on	national	 issues).	This	perspective	gave	rise	to	criticism	from	Socialists	and	was	
presented	as	an	attempt	to	gain	support	from	additional	voters	and	to	ensure	long-lasting	
rule	for	the	political	right.	However,	Jobbik	–	calling	for	a	“peaceful	shift	of	the	borders”	–	
may	benefit	from	granting	voting	rights	to	diaspora	as	well.	
The	efforts	aimed	at	strengthening	the	‘responsibility’	for	compatriots	living	in	other	coun-
tries	are	accompanied	by	the	rhetoric	of	‘overcoming’	the	Treaty	of	Trianon	of	1920	(under	
which	a	significant	part	of	Hungary	was	divided	among	its	neighbours)	through	integration	
of	the	Hungarian	nation	above	the	existing	political	borders.	The	government’s	emphasising	
of	these	issues	is	also	aimed	at	preventing	radical	groupings	from	taking	over	these	slogans	
(first	of	all	the	opposition	party	Jobbik,	which	is	the	third	strongest	grouping	in	parliament).	
However,	at	the	same	time,	under	Orbán’s	rule,	Trianon	has	become	an	official	symbol	of	
Hungarian	identity	as	the	quintessence	of	national	tragedy.	Although	all	right-wing	move-
ments	have	been	aiming	at	this	since	1989,	it	was	Orbán	who	started	building	the	state	
ideology	on	this	foundation	after	he	became	prime	minister	in	2010.
Reactions abroad
The	new	constitution	includes	references	to	God,	the	Christian	roots	of	Hungary	and	the	one	
thousand	year	history	of	the	nation.	It	opens	with	the	first	line	from	the	Hungarian	national	
anthem	‘God,	bless	the	Hungarians’	and	a	preamble	called	the	‘national	confession	of	faith.’	
Axiological,	moral	and	ethical	elements	combined	with	conservative	symbolism	have	raised	
controversies	 both	 at	 home	 and	 abroad.	 The	Hungarian	 left-wing	 and	 liberal	 circles	 have	
criticised	the	government	on	the	international	forum.	The	constitution	is	also	being	criticised	
by	the	political	left	and	liberals	for	ideologi-
cal	reasons	because	it	defines	marriage	as	
a	relationship	between	a	man	and	woman,	
and	provides	for	the	protection	of	life	from	
the	 moment	 conception,	 which	 is	 seen	
as	opening	up	the	way	to	a	ban	on	abor-
tion.	Some	non-governmental	organisations	
also	 see	 the	 new	 constitution	 as	 a	 docu-
ment	which	‘excludes	those	who	think	oth-
erwise’	and	have	criticised	it	for	the	lack	of	
regulations	protecting	sexual	minorities,	women	and	the	handicapped7.	In	turn,	the	national	
symbolism	of	the	preamble	and	references	to	the	 ‘old	Hungary’	combined	with	regulations	
aimed	at	strengthening	the	bonds	with	compatriots	living	abroad	have	given	rise	to	a	number	
of	 comments	 (from	politicians,	 political	 analysts	 and	publicists,	 especially	 in	 Slovakia	 and	
Romania),	who	are	warning	against	the	legalising	of	revisionist	tendencies.	
The	Hungarian	constitution	has	also	been	criticised	by	the	faction	of	Socialists,	Liberals	and	
Greens	in	the	European	Parliament.	Although	the	largest	grouping	within	these	circles,	the	
European	People’s	Party	–	which	Fidesz	and	KDNP	are	members	of	–	opposed	this,	left-
wing	factions	initiated	a	special	debate	and	managed	to	push	through	a	very	critical	resolu-
tion	on	5	June	2011	pointing	first	of	all	to	the	general	axiology	of	the	constitution	(including	
formulations	concerning	moral	and	ethical	issues).	In	this	stance,	the	European	Parliament	
The granting of the right of vote to 
Hungarians living abroad will increase 
the significance of issues related 
to bonds with compatriots living abroad 
in Hungarian politics and will introduce 
a new electorate with the potential 
to influence Hungary’s foreign policy.
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8	 Új	magyar	alkotmány:	aggódik	
a	német	külügyminisztérium,	
18	April	2011,	http://hvg.hu
	
	
	
	
	
	
9	 Vyhlásenie	MZV	SR	
k	prijatiu	maďarskej	ústavy,	
18	April	2011,	www.mzv.sk
	
	
10	 Vyhlásenie	Národnej	rady	
Slovenskej	republiky	k	prijatiu	
Základného	zákona	Maďarska,	
27	May	2011.	www.nrsr.sk
recommended	that	the	European	Commission	check	whether	 the	Hungarian	constitution	
and	the	laws	which	accompany	it	comply	with	the	letter	and	spirit	of	EU	law.	
Representatives	of	the	Hungarian	political	right	rejected	these	accusations,	and	emphasised	
instead	that	this	is	the	first	basic	law	in	Europe	to	include	regulations	from	the	Charter	of	
Fundamental	Rights	of	the	European	Union.	The	solutions	they	presented	as	the	most	in-
novative	included	regulations	pertaining	to	the	protection	of	the	natural	environment,	sus-
tainable	economy	and	guarantees	preventing	excessive	indebtedness	of	the	state.	Fidesz,	
while	repelling	the	attacks	on	the	constitution,	eagerly	presented	its	criticism	at	home	and	
in	the	international	community	as	a	sign	of	a	political	clash	between	left-wing	and	liberal	
groupings	on	one	side	and	 the	 right	on	 the	other,	or	as	a	continuation	of	efforts	aimed	
at	undermining	the	Hungarian	presidency	of	the	Council	of	the	EU.	
The	new	constitution	sparked	an	 international	discussion,	 including	opinions	questioning	
Hungary’s	 right	 to	determine	 the	 foundations	of	 its	own	political	system	due	 to	 their	al-
leged	conflict	with	‘European	values’.	A	suggestion	of	this	type	also	appeared	in	a	state-
ment	 made	 by	 Werner	 Hoyer,	 secretary	
of	 state	 at	 the	German	Foreign	Ministry,	
who	criticised	the	way	in	which	the	new	
Hungarian	 constitution	was	adopted	and	
its	text8.	Concern	about	‘some	regulations’	
was	expressed	by	UN	Secretary	General	
Ban	Ki-moon,	and	US	Secretary	of	State	
Hillary	Clinton	appealed	for	the	building	of	
a	constitutional	order	which	gives	due	re-
spect	to	‘democratic	freedoms’	during	her	
visit	in	Hungary	at	the	end	of	June	2011.	
Reservations	about	some	regulations	of	the	new	constitution	have	also	been	made	by	Slovakia,	
where	the	Hungarian	minority	accounts	for	the	largest	part	of	the	population	as	compared	to	
other	states	neighbouring	Hungary.	Although	the	issue	of	electoral	rights	has	not	yet	been	pre-
cisely	regulated,	the	promise	of	extending	them	to	compatriots	living	in	neighbouring	countries	
and	the	formulations	concerning	Hungary’s	‘responsibility’	for	these	communities	was	under-
stood	in	Bratislava	as	support	for	the	efforts	of	Hungarian	communities	abroad	to	be	granted	
collective	rights	and	provoked	negative	reactions9.	Slovakia	is	opposing	solutions	of	this	kind,	
which	are	openly	promoted	by	Hungary,	believing	that	the	model	for	minority	protection	which	
guarantees	rights	to	representatives	of	national	minorities	as	part	of	the	rights	vested	indi-
vidually	in	each	human	being	and	citizen	and	not	in	a	certain	cultural	or	ethnic	group	is	the	
European	standard.	The	Slovak	parliament	adopted	a	resolution	stating	that	Slovakia	would	
not	recognise	those	provisions	of	the	new	Hungarian	constitution	which	will	have	exterritorial	
effect.	However,	the	Slovak	opposition	insisted	on	a	much	more	moderate	reaction10.	
Dual	citizenship	is	still	a	disputable	area	in	Slovak-Hungarian	relations.	Although	it	is	a	subject	
of	bilateral	talks,	no	major	progress	is	likely	to	be	made	in	this	field.	Extending	voting	right	
to	citizens	in	neighbouring	countries	is	likely	to	cause	more	tension	in	Slovak-Hungarian	rela-
tions	and	heat	up	the	political	atmosphere	in	Slovakia.	Compatriots	voting	abroad	may	also	
complicate	Hungary’s	relations	with	its	other	neighbours,	which	are	home	to	large	Hungarian	
communities.	These	countries	have	not	officially	criticised	the	Hungarian	citizenship	regula-
tions	 (partly	because	 they	have	applied	similar	solutions	 to	 their	own	compatriots	 living	 in	
other	countries).	Nevertheless,	activities	which	refer	to	‘overcoming”	the	Treaty	of	Trianon	have	
also	been	used	for	internal	political	struggle	in	Romania	and	may	adversely	affect	Romanian-	
-Hungarian	relations	which	have	been	developing	well	over	the	past	few	years.		
Fidesz eagerly presented its criticism 
at home and in the international com-
munity as a sign of a political clash 
between left-wing and liberal groupings 
on one side and the right on the other, 
or as a continuation of efforts aimed 
at undermining the Hungarian 
presidency of the Council of the EU. 
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The stance of the Venice Commission
The	Venice	Commission,	an	advisory	body	of	the	Council	of	Europe	for	constitutional	 is-
sues,	reacted	with	satisfaction	to	the	fact	that	the	new	Hungarian	constitution	is	based	on	
democratic	principles,	the	rule	of	law	and	the	protection	of	fundamental	rights.	However,	
it	 formulated	 a	 number	 of	 detailed	 reservations.	 The	 commission,	which	was	 asked	 by	
the	Hungarian	government	 to	express	an	opinion	on	the	draft	constitution,	made	critical	
comments	first	of	all	regarding	the	reduction	of	the	Constitutional	Court’s	powers	and	in-
creasing	the	number	of	laws	which	require	a	qualified	majority	to	be	passed11.	The	Venice	
Commission’s	complete	opinion	on	the	new	constitution,	prepared	by	five	experts	(including	
the	former	Polish	prime	minister,	Hanna	Suchocka),	was	passed	at	the	plenary	session	on	
17–18	June	201112.	
The	 commission	 criticised	 above	 all	 the	
constitutional	 process	 itself,	which	 in	 its	
opinion	 was	 insufficiently	 transparent.	
Dialogue	 between	 the	 ruling	 party	 and	
the	 opposition	 was	 missing,	 adequate	
conditions	 for	 a	 public	 debate	 were	 not	
created,	and	the	process	as	a	whole	was	
too	 hasty.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 com-
mission	 expressed	hope	 that	 the	 adoption	 of	 constitutional	 laws	would	be	preceded	by	
a	proper	public	debate.	In	the	commission’s	opinion,	some	areas	should	rather	be	passed	by	
an	ordinary	majority	of	the	votes	than	regulated	with	laws	of	this	kind.	This	concerns	for	
example:	cultural,	 religious,	moral,	socio-economic	and	financial	policy.	The	commission	
also	addressed	the	issues	which	had	been	criticised	most	of	all	thus	far,	namely	the	reduc-
tion	of	the	Constitutional	Court’s	competences	in	the	area	of	state	finances	and	granting	
extensive	powers	to	the	Budget	Council	(including	the	right	to	veto	the	budget	law).	In	the	
commission’s	opinion,	these	may	have	a	potentially	negative	effect	on	the	democratic	order	
and	upset	the	balance	of	power.	
The	Venice	Commission	also	expressed	reservations	about	the	state’s	responsibility	for	Hun-
garian	minority	communities	in	other	countries.	The	commission	shared	its	concern	that	the	
exterritorial	application	of	the	constitution’s	regulations	could	lead	to	unnecessary	tension	in	
relations	with	neighbouring	countries.	The	commission	also	pointed	out	that	responsibility	
for	protecting	minority	rights	rested	primarily	with	the	country	where	such	minorities	lived.	
The	commission’s	opinion	was	received	with	satisfaction	by	the	Slovakian	Foreign	Ministry,	
which	saw	it	as	completely	complying	with	Slovakia’s	stance	on	this	issue13.	
Representatives	of	 the	governing	Fidesz	party	stressed	 the	positive	evaluations	 included	
in	the	commission’s	opinion	and	stated	that	the	fact	that	the	detailed	legal	opinion	differed	
at	some	points	from	their	stance	was	something	natural.	They	declared	they	would	take	into	
consideration	the	commission’s	comments	further	on	in	the	legislative	process,	emphasis-
ing	however	that	these	were	not	binding	for	Hungary.	
Possible developments
Fidesz	has	promised	a	continuation	of	the	state’s	political	reform.	Around	thirty	constitu-
tional	laws	are	to	be	passed	by	the	end	of	2011,	including	those	concerning	local	govern-
ment,	the	operation	of	parliament,	and	judicial	reform.	Parliament	will	vote	on	them	during	
its	autumn	session.	It	may	be	expected	that	the	most	heated	debate	will	be	over	the	voting	
system	and	local	government	reforms,	which	may	bring	about	changes	on	the	Hungarian	
political	scene.	Protests	and	also	disputes	within	the	government	team	may	arise	due	to	
The Venice Commission shared its con-
cern that the exterritorial application 
of the constitution’s regulations could 
lead to unnecessary tension in rela-
tions with neighbouring countries.
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14	 Ugrásszerűen	nőtt	a	bizonytala-
nok	aránya,	gyengült	
az	ellenzék,	22	June	2011,
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news/2011/kitekint/20110622.
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the	reduction	already	announced	of	parliamentary	seats	from	the	present	number	of	386	
to	200.	Granting	electoral	rights	to	Hungarians	living	in	neighbouring	countries	is	likely	to	
increase	tension	in	Slovak-Hungarian	relations	and	may	give	rise	to	negative	reactions	also	
in	other	neighbouring	countries,	thus	strengthening	the	temptation	to	play	the	‘Hungarian	
card’	also	in	domestic	politics.	
The	new	constitution	has	increased	the	already	significant	number	of	laws	which	require	
a	qualified	majority.	Some	of	them	have	already	been	adopted,	others	will	be	amended	in	
the	next	few	months.	These	may	be	durable	changes	because	the	weak	opposition	has	no	
chance	of	gaining	a	constitutional	majority	in	parliament	in	the	immediate	future.	This	will	
make	work	difficult	 for	subsequent	governments	because	 they	will	have	 to	seek	support	
from	the	opposition	to	amend	laws	regulating	numerous	areas	related	to	state	policy.	
The	new	constitution	and	the	activities	which	accompanied	its	creation	betray	efforts	to	
preserve	the	existing	system	of	ruling	the	
country.	This	gives	rise	to	reasonable	sus-
picions	that	politicians	from	the	governing	
team	 have	 hastily	 adopted	 the	 constitu-
tion	 and	 want	 to	 pass	 as	 many	 consti-
tutional	 laws	 as	 possible	 because	 they	
are	 considering	 the	possibility	 of	 holding	
new	elections	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	2012.	
Fidesz	 still	 enjoys	 the	 strongest	 support	
(28%	according	to	a	poll	in	June,	with	12%	support	for	the	Socialists)14,	and	is	uncertain	
whether	the	public,	tired	with	reforms,	will	not	turn	their	backs	on	it	before	the	elections	in	
2014.	If	elections	were	held	next	year,	Fidesz	would	almost	certainly	win.	Although	it	would	
not	have	the	advantage	it	has	now,	the	new	constitution	would	already	be	in	force	and	all	
the	essential	 laws	which	require	a	qualified	majority	would	have	been	passed.	It	cannot	
be	ruled	out	that	the	entry	into	force	of	the	new	constitution	and	a	major	change	in	voting	
regulations	could	be	used	as	a	pretext	 for	 the	dissolution	of	parliament	and	 the	holding	
of	new	elections.
Politicians from the governing team 
have hastily adopted the constitution 
and want to pass as many constitutio-
nal laws as possible because they are 
considering the possibility of holding 
new elections at the beginning of 2012.
i s s u e  6 0  |  2 9 . 0 7 . 2 0 1 1  |  c e N T R e  f O R  e A s T e R N  s T u d i e s
cOMMeNTARyOsw
9OSW.WAW.PL
© Copyright	by	OSW
	
Editors:	Olaf	Osica	
Anna	Łabuszewska
Translation:	Ilona	Duchnowicz
Co-operation:	Nicholas	Furnival
DTP:	Wojciech	Mańkowski
The Centre for Eastern Studies (CES)	was	established	in	1990.	CES	is	financed	from	the	budget.	
The	Centre	monitors	and	analyses	the	political,	economic	and	social	situation	in	Russia,	Central	
and	Eastern	European	countries,	the	Balkans,	the	Caucasus	and	the	Central	Asia.	
CES focuses	 on	 the	 key	 political,	 economic	 and	 security	 issues,	 such	 as	 internal	 situations	
and	 stability	 of	 the	 mentioned	 countries,	 the	 systems	 of	 power,	 relations	 between	 political	
centres,	foreign	policies,	issues	related	to	NATO	and	EU	enlargement,	energy	supply	security,	
existing	and	potential	conflicts,	among	other	issues.	
The views expressed by the authors of the papers do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities. 
Centre for Eastern Studies
Koszykowa	6A,	
00-564	Warsaw
e-mail:	info@osw.waw.pl	
Hungarians in Central Europe
M A P
